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ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL PRIVATE RIGHTS AGAINST
STATES AFTER ALDEN V. MAINE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
HUTTO v. FINNEY AND COMPENSATION VIA CIVIL
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
GORDON G. YOUNG*
I. INTRODUCTION
As described in initial news reports, last term's decisions in Alden
v. Maine' and its companion cases2 drastically changed American fed-
eralism. Alden caps a line of recent cases on state immunity from suit.
Among other things, these cases seem to hold that private individuals
cannot sue states to recover monetary compensation for the violation
of fights created by Congress solely under Article I of the Constitu-
tion.' One accomplished legal affairs reporter concluded that these
* Copyright © 2000 by Gordon G. Young. Professor of Law, University of Maryland
School of Law. J.D., New York University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard University Law
School. I am grateful for comments from David Bogen, Ruth Fleischer, Vicki Jackson, and
Mark Strasser.
1. 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267-68 (1999) (concluding that the states are free to refuse to
open their own courts to a wide variety of suits brought against them by persons possessing
rights under federal law).
2. Alden's companion cases deal with specialized exceptions to state immunity from
suit. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2226-27, 2229-31 (1999) (holding (1) that Congress's exceptional powers, under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate state immunity from suit extend only to
circumstances in which abrogation is a reasonable way of protecting interests guaranteed
by that Amendment and (2) finding that the state had not waived its immunity from suit);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank and United States,
119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (holding that Congress's exceptional powers, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate state immunity from suit extend only to suits to pro-
tect interests guaranteed by that amendment). For a fuller discussion of Congress's power
to abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment and the limits on those
powers that Alden's companion cases recognize, see infra note 8 and accompanying text.
3. The first of the recent cases is Seminole Tribe v. Forida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Among
other things, Seminole concluded that Congress has no power, under Article I alone, to
create rights enforceable in federal court against unconsenting states. Id. at 65-66, 72-73
(noting that "[t] he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal
jurisdiction"); see also Gordon G. Young, Comment, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 56 MD. L. REV.
1411, 1428-33 (1997) (examining the possible implications of the Seminole holding on the
development of state immunity jurisprudence). In this respect, Seminole overruled an ear-
lier decision, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which allows Article I "abro-
gation" of states' immunity from federal court suits. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 66. As a
consequence of Seminole, suits to enforce statutory rights created under Article I cannot be
brought against an unconsenting state in federal court unless the rights have vested as life,
liberty or property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and Congress has
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cases "flatly reject the notion that federal laws take precedence over
state authority."4 Others also saw the decisions as dire. By means of a
droll hypothetical, Duke Law School professor, Walter Dellinger, ex-
plored just how far this line of cases might be pushed to undercut
states' obligations to follow federal law. Here is Professor Dellinger, as
introduced by National Public Radio reporter Nina Totenberg a few
days after Alden was decided:
NINA TOTENBERG reporting:
The court's decisions granting new power to the states repre-
sent a vision of the American structure of government differ-
ent from the one that's prevailed for most of this century...
The court's rulings appear to give states such sweeping im-
munity that Duke law professor and former Solicitor General
Walter Dellinger appeared before a group of reporters
tongue-in-cheek to announce he was resigning his job in the
private sector to run for governor of North Carolina. His
one campaign pledge, he said, would be to repeal the state
income tax and fund state education by establishing a state-
run company to manufacture and sell Nike knock-offs [in vi-
olation of federal trademark and minimum wage laws].
validly abrogated state immunity under that amendment. See infra notes 7, 20 and accom-
panying text. Because suits against officers seeking compensation from the state treasury
for past state wrongs are also classified as against a state, these too cannot be permitted by
Congress under its Article I powers. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-69 (1974)
(permitting federal courts to issue orders against state officers compelling prospective
compliance with federal law but prohibiting orders against state officers to pay damages
out of state funds for past violations of federal law); see also infra notes 52-55 and accompa-
nying text.
In simple terms, what Alden adds to this line of cases is protection of states from suits
in their own courts asserting federal law violations. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266 (holding
that "[i]n light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, ...
the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation"). More technically, Alden finds
that, generally, there is no federal compulsion for a state court to hear suits brought
against their sovereigns based on federal law, except perhaps that created by or under the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments. For a more complete description of
these cases and this doctrine, see infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. See also Young,
supra note 3, at 1428-45 (examining the possible ramifications of the Seminole holding on
the development of state immunity jurisprudence). While, generally, state courts are not
compelled by federal law to hear suits against their own sovereign unless the state waives its
immunity or Congress enacts a valid law abrogating that immunity, there may be some
circumstances in which such compulsion exists. See supra note 45 (dealing with possible
exceptions for claims against the state involving takings of property or tax refunds).
4. Joan Biskupic, Justices, 5-4, Strengthen State Rights, WAsH. PosT, June 24, 1999, at Al.
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Professor WALTER DELLINGER (Duke University): It will
be very easy to make a considerable profit on these matters
because we'll be paying $1.25 an hour to those who work in
our copying facilities. This may be bad news for the business
community, but it's certainly good news for the taxpayers
and citizens of the state of North Carolina.5
Are federal statutes, enacted under Congress's Article I powers,
really no longer binding on the states as claimed by the first reporter
mentioned above? That depends on whether, after Alden, there are
consequences for a state's violating them. And, as it turns out, there
are. Were Professor Dellinger Nike's lawyer in his hypothetical (or
lawyer for the losing plaintiffs in Alden), his next step surely would be
to sue the appropriate state officer in his official capacity to enjoin
future violations of federal law. Supreme Court decisions continue to
allow prospective suits of this sort, brought to subject states to federal
control. To this extent, federal law remains supreme. 6
Despite this, the Alden line of cases may dramatically change fed-
eralism. It may (or as I suggest below it may not) be what it seems: a
complete protection for states against having to pay compensation for
wrongs to private interests created by Congress solely under that
body's Article I powers. If it is a flat prohibition, then in some real
sense, when legislating under Article I, Congress cannot create private
rights against the states.7 But this is not clear. There are two remain-
5. WEEKEND EDITION SATURDAY (NPR radio broadcast, June 26, 1999).
6. See Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) ("[I]ndividuals who, as officers of
the State ... threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal
nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action."); see also
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 52-57 (generally recognizing the validity of federal court suits brought
to force state officers' prospective compliance with federal law); infra notes 50-51, 54-56
and accompanying text (explaining the rationale for Ex pane Young actions).
7. By "in some real sense" I recognize that, near the boundary line, the distinction
between laws creating private rights and those creating public duties blurs, and the proper
nomenclature is debatable. Certainly one might choose to describe an obligation created
for the benefit of a private party, but ultimately enforceable only by governmental suit
(such as a criminal contempt proceeding), as a private right. But it would be a marginal
and debatable classification.
As for the importance of which of Congress's powers to regulate is in play when it
attempts to override or "abrogate" states' immunity from suit, Congress possesses the
power, when legislating under the Fourteenth Amendment (and probably under the Thir-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments) to subject states to liability to suit in federal court (and
probably in state court as well). See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (conclud-
ing that "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts" (foot-
note omitted)). The power that the Court recognized in Congress to do the same, when
[VOL. 59:440
2000] ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL PRIVATE RIGHTS
ing possibilities for compensation. The first is congressional abroga-
tion of state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. At least
some statutory rights, created by Congress under its Article I powers,
will become property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.' Under current law, Congress has power to abrogate states' im-
munity from suits brought to enforce such rights. Butjust how far the
Fourteenth Amendment can be used for these purposes is less than
legislating under Article I (Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989)) was repu-
diated in Seminole, 517 U.S. at 65-66. See supra note 3.
8. Alden's two companion cases addressed this possibility, as did one Supreme Court
case decided as this Article went to press. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), decided the same day as Alden, one of
the plaintiffs contentions was that the state had violated property rights created by Con-
gress under its Article I powers to regulate commerce, thus allowing Congress to abrogate
state immunity to protect property under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
2224-25. As for the need for a basis of abrogation in the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra
notes 6-7 and accompanying text. The College Savings Bank majority seemed to recognize
that Congress possesses some power to abrogate state immunity under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, with respect to claims against states for deprivations of property
created by Congress under Article I. 119 S. Ct. at 2224-25. It left open the possibility that
Congress might abrogate state immunity to a trademark infringement suit, while distin-
guishing the unfair competition suit before it as in no sense involving a deprivation of
property that could be regulated by Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Flor-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and United States, 119
S. Ct. 2199 (1999), the Court confronted a patent infringement claim against the State of
Florida. The majority rejected Congress's attempt to expose states to such suits while rec-
ognizing that patent rights were property rights whose violation might allow congressional
authorization of a suit against an offending state in an appropriate circumstance. Id. at
2206-09. Among other things it was (1) the lack of evidence of systematic and intentional
violation of federally created property rights and (2) the lack of evidence that state law
remedies were inadequate that caused the Court to find no deprivation of property cogni-
zable under the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, no power of Congress, under Section 5
of that amendment, to abrogate immunity as an appropriate way of enforcing the Amend-
ment itself. Finally, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000), a majority of
the Court found that the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
purporting to abrogate state immunity were beyond Congress's powers of remediation
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals that Congress
had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were unconsti-
tutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age. Although
that lack of support is not determinative of the § 5 inquiry, . . . Congress' failure
to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here con-
firms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation
was necessary in this field. In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's sub-
stantive requirements, and the lack of evidence of widespread and unconstitu-
tional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the ADEA is not a valid
exercise of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
ADEA's purported abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity is accordingly
invalid.
Id. at 649 (citations omitted).
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certain.9 This Article, however, focuses on another mechanism for
compensation, based on the assumption that a Fourteenth Amend-
ment protective cocoon will be unavailable at least for some rights
created under Article 1.1 ° This second mechanism is compensation by
means of civil contempt actions for state violations of federal court
injunctions. If this option is available, it would reach a great deal,
though not all,1 1 of the harm resulting from state violations of federal
laws based on Article I.
Imagine that Nike, in the hypothetical above, or the losing plain-
tiffs in Alden, do procure a federal court injunction, as indeed they
may under existing law, and that the state violates it. Will they go
uncompensated for all of the harm that they suffer because of a viola-
tion of their federal rights, as fortified by the injunction? One
Supreme Court case, Hutto v. Finney, 2 suggests strongly that a state
must pay, via civil contempt or other similar proceedings, for most
harm to federal rights protected by the injunction. This interpreta-
tion of Hutto is supported by a Court of Appeals opinion written by
Judge Richard Posner. 3 On this view, it would be meaningful to say
that Congress can pursue its Article I objectives by the creation of (1)
public regulatory schemes, enforceable by government' 4 or private
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (indicating that the Court will scrutinize
congressional attempts to abrogate state immunity to determine that they are reasonably
necessary to enforce the Fourteenth Amendments prohibitions against deprivations of
property).
10. See supra note 8 (indicating serious limitations on Congress's power to abrogate
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). In addition to cases in which Congress,
despite an attempt, is unable to abrogate under the Court's stringent requirements, abro-
gation is also unavailable in cases where Congress has passed no law attempting to abro-
gate. In both circumstances, by hypothesis, a federal right exists, but its assertion in court
is frustrated by state immunity.
11. This doctrinal view would deny-in the absence of state waiver or congressional
abrogation of state immunity-compensation for harm caused by states' violations of fed-
eral rights not prohibited by an injunction. Consequently, all harm suffered before a
plaintiff procures an injunction and that suffered afterward, but not covered by the court
order, would be lost.
12. 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see infra Part III.
13. Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987); see infra notes 70-71
and accompanying text.
14. Suits by the federal government are not barred by state immunity. See United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-42 (1965). However, what counts as a suit by the
federal government for purposes of state immunity is currently the subject of some dispute.
Private individuals, meeting certain procedural requirements, have been allowed to sue on
behalf of the United States to recover for certain fraud committed against the United
States. The proceeds of such suits are shared by the United States and the private party
initiating the suit, based on a statutory formula. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729
(1994). These parties may be seen as deputized and paid private attorneys general, used to
supplement limited federal enforcement resources. Currently before the Supreme Court
[VOL. 59:440
2000] ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL PRIVATE RIGHTS
parties, 5 (2) by private rights enforceable by individuals, or (3) by
creation of both. Any private rights simply require a court order to
make them fully effective against states.
The emergence of this strong reading of Hutto is not inevitable.
Hutto may also be read in a weak way or be overruled. The Court's
recent intense solicitude for the interests of states which violate fed-
eral law makes its limiting of Hutto a real possibility. As discussed
later, such a turn would best be interpreted, not as a decision about
states' immunity from suits, but as a return to an earlier Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, severely limiting the scope of Congress's
substantive Article I powers to regulate states. 16
is the question of whether such qui tam suits, when brought against states, will be treated as
suits by the United States, and thus allowed to proceed despite state immunity. See Ver-
mont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999)
(granting certiorari, inter alia, to determine whether the qui tam suits against states are
consistent with state immunity and reviewing United States v. Vermont Agency of Natural Re-
sources, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Peripherally to this Article, but significantly, the case also raises the issue of whether
qui tam suits, brought against either states or private defendants, are consistent with the
unalterable constitutional standing requirements of Article III. See Stevens, 119 S. Ct. 2391
(on the Court's own initiative, directing the parties before it to file supplemental briefs
addressing the following question: "Does a private person have standing under Article III
to litigate claims of fraud upon the government?").
15. Private enforcement of public schemes takes a variety of forms. Traditionally, Con-
gress has been able to create private interests, short of full blown property rights, to assure
that public law schemes are suitably enforced. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479
U.S. 388, 394-99 (1987) (allowing standing to those arguably within the zone of interests
protected by the enabling act, while noting that the test is not particularly demanding and
does not require a congressional purpose to benefit the would be plaintiff); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (allowing broadcasters standing to challenge the
statutory legality of grants of licenses to competitors, although they possessed no property
right to exclude others). Sometimes these private interests conferring standing, yet not
amounting to property rights, have been described as existing in favor of those explicitly or
implicitly designated private attorneys general. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316
U.S. 4, 14 (1942). The zone of interests and private attorneys general cases converge. See
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 397 n.12 (equating those within the zone of interest with those who
would be reliable private attorneys generals).
At one time, Congress's power to confer standing on any individual or group to re-
dress any violation of law seemed possibly limitless. Congress could do so by either stating
that a class of people (e.g., all citizens) is injured by a legal violation (illegal pollution
anywhere) or by designating any group (e.g., all citizens) private attorneys generals to re-
dress such violation. See supra paragraph. Recently, the Court has cut back on the once
apparently endless power of Congress to grant standing on these theories and seems
poised to cut back more. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding
that standing to enforce public law schemes does not exist simply because Congress recog-
nizes an injury but, rather, requires the presence of some minimum harm as recognized by
the Constitution).
16. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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Immediately below, in Part II, this Article describes the Supreme
Court cases on federalism with a special emphasis on those dealing
with state immunity from suit. In Part III, it turns to a discussion of
Hutto which suggests that civil contempt and similar actions may offer
an alternative, if imperfect, route to compensation. Finally, in Part IV,
it discusses and evaluates the choices that confront the Court in har-
monizing Alden and other state immunity cases with cases in the Hutto
line.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES ON FEDERALISM
A. Substantive Federal Power to Regulate States
While the focus of this Article is state immunity from suit under
federal law, it will be helpful to discuss briefly the substantive powers
of Congress to regulate the states, both under the original Constitu-
tion and under the Reconstruction Amendments. This discussion is
helpful for two reasons. First, as discussed more fully below, Congress
can eliminate state immunity from suit when regulating states under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but not when regulating under the Com-
merce Clause. 7 Second, the Court's recent state immunity decisions
might be seen as an attempt, by other means, to seriously limit a line
of cases permitting Congress great freedom to regulate states under
the Commerce Clause. Later in this Article, I suggest that Alden may
have this effect."a In particular, Alden may deny Congress the power
to create meaningful private rights under powers granted it in the
original Constitution, most notably the Interstate Commerce Clause." °
The civil rights amendments are unusual constitutional provi-
sions, unmistakably contemplating federal regulation operating
against states with respect to due process, equal protection, voting
rights and guarantees against slavery.2' But what was and is the power
17. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (describing the line of decisions end-
ing, for now, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV. Each of these amendments is directed at limiting
states, and each of them ends with a clause authorizing congressional enforcement. See
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist within
the United States .... Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.... The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV ("The right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by. . . any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude .... The Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
[VOL. 59:440
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of Congress to regulate states under the original Constitution, particu-
larly the commerce clause? An early opinion, McCulloch v. Maryland,21
can be seen as cutting in two different directions.
Implicit rules, principles, and policies are not always weaker than
explicit ones. Consider the phrase "it goes without saying," indicating
that something is so clear that it does not need to be said. Some con-
stitutional law fits this description well. McCulloch v. Maryland 2 pro-
vides the earliest and most powerful example. It holds that state
legislation that sufficiently threatens the existence or effectiveness of
the United States is invalid because it is inconsistent with the constitu-
tional enterprise as originally understood, not because it violates a
specific provision of the document.23 Possibly some federal regula-
tion of states, analogously, is inconsistent with their sovereignty as im-
plicit in the founding document and circumstances. Cutting the
other way, the theory of representative democracy, discussed in McCul-
loch, might lead to the belief that the states are adequately protected
against actions of the federal government by their representation in
Congress while, in general, the citizens of the United States are not
adequately represented in any single state legislature. 24 On this sec-
ond view, a view still officially, if precariously, held by the Supreme
Court as to most federal regulation of states,25 there are few state sov-
ereignty limits on Congress in regulating states under its Article I
powers.
At least from 1936 until 1968, the entire Court seemed to view
Congress's Article I regulatory powers over states as no more limited
than those over individuals.26 When suggestions of special limits
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 426-30.
24. See id. at 431 ("In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The
legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of
controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused."); see
also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-52 (discussing state
sovereignty and noting "that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in
large part to protect the States from overreaching by Congress" (footnote omitted)).
25. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (finding no occasion to
revisit Garcia).
26. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936) ("The sovereign power of
the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of grants of power to the federal govern-
ment .. "). Thirty-two years later in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), two dissenters
suggested that there might be some special protection for states from congressional regula-
tory powers. See id. at 204-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that if Congress's power
under the commerce clause extends to permit federal regulation of "essential functions
being carried on by the States," then the federal government "could devour the essentials
of state sovereignty").
2000]
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favoring states began to appear, they were most intelligible, not as in-
terpretations of Article I's commerce clauses, but as notions that
either the Tenth Amendment or some very basic yet implicit state sov-
ereignty shielded states from the full force of general federal
regulation.2 7
Subsequently, the Court has vacillated as to whether, and in what
circumstances, states themselves can be regulated by federal laws. In
1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery,28 the Court first held that
states could not be regulated under the commerce clause when acting
traditionally as states.2 9 Nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority,3 ° the Court reversed course and held that,
except in exceptional circumstances, Congress can regulate states
under the commerce clause in the same way that it regulates individu-
als. 1 To be concrete, in the first case the Court rejected, and in the
second accepted, the application of federal minimum wage laws to
states.32 In both of these cases, the voting margin was one justice.
In Garcia, three dissenters seemed committed to overturning the
decision. 4
27. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (noting that the Tenth
Amendment makes explicit the constitutional policy that "Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in
a federal system."); Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 205 (Justices Douglas and Stewart dissenting, on the
ground that principles, explicitly guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment, limit what would
otherwise be Congress's power to regulate under the commerce clause). Later cases such
as New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) indicate that the Tenth Amendment and Eleventh Amendment make explicit pro-
tections that were implicit in the original Constitution. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 54 (concluding
that state sovereign immunity from suit existed implicitly in the original Constitution and
that the Eleventh Amendment cleared up a misunderstanding as to its existence). As to
limits on federal powers to regulate states, New York v. United States makes clear that the
current majority sees the limits as originally implicit and predating the textual amendment
designed to make their existence, if not their precise content, explicit:
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is
not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have dis-
cussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that
the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given
instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to
determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by
a limitation on an Article I power.
505 U.S. at 156-57.
28. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
29. Id. at 845, 852.
30. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
31. Id. at 555-57.
32. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 851-52; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-56.
33. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (5-4 decision); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (5-4 decision).
34. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court's action reflects a
serious misunderstanding, if not an outright rejection, of the history of our country and
[VOL. 59:440
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Since Garcia, the pendulum has swung away from Garcia and back
toward National League of Cities, as the Court has grown increasingly to
favor states' rights. Though it has never overruled Garcia, it has nar-
rowed it somewhat. In two recent cases, a majority identified particu-
lar, and narrow, types of federal legislation that violate states' rights.
The first is legislation that forces states to enact a specified matter as
state law35 and the second is legislation that forces state officers to
administer federally enacted regulatory schemes.3 6 While the limits
on substantive regulation of states have moved in the direction of al-
lowing less regulation, the Court has also narrowed, even more dra-
matically, the possibility of remedies for violations of regulations that
do remain substantively valid. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 7 Seminole v.
Florida,8 and Alden form this body of case law. It is this body of immu-
nity law that now presses, with special force, the question of the kinds
of relief that can be granted in favor of an individual and against a
state for violation of federal court orders.
B. State Immunity from Suit
The history of a federal constitutional immunity of states and
state officers from suits is equally long and even more confusing than
the flip-flopping story of decisions dealing with the validity of federal
substantive regulation of states. Below, I outline the most basic fea-
tures of this body of law. While state immunity from suit is often de-
scribed as Eleventh Amendment immunity,39 that amendment turns
out to play only a supporting role for the constitutional protections
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution." (footnote omitted)); id. at 580 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court."); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (sharingJustice
Rehnquist's belief that "this Court will in time again assume its constitutional
responsibility").
35. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (striking down a federal
statute that forced states to either take title to low level radioactive waste or to regulate
pursuant to the direction of Congress).
36. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding that Congress may
not compel state law enforcement officers to perform background checks on perspective
gun purchasers pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act).
37. 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (limiting an exception to state immunity). For a fuller descrip-
tion of this case, see infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
38. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). For a detailed discussion of Seminole, see infra notes 46-61 and
accompanying text. See also Young, supra note 3.
39. See generally Young, supra note 3, at 1413, 1413 n.13 (surveying state immunity cases
and explaining the differences between and the confusion often associated with Hans im-
munity and Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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that the states' rights majority finds implicit in the original docu-
ment.4" The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.4'
Read literally, this provision prohibits citizens of any state, A,
from suing any other state, B, in federal court. On such a reading, it
has no application to (1) any suits in state court, or (2) suits brought
by citizens of A against their own state, even if in federal court. Even
as to suits in federal court by citizens of state A against state B, which
are literally covered by the Amendment, broader context offers strong
arguments that the provision does not apply to the extent that such a
suit is brought to enforce federal law.4
2
Strangely, while state immunity has expanded, the Eleventh
Amendment itself has played an increasingly smaller role, as the Court
found another source of the protections for states against suits under
federal law. As early as 1890 the Court found an immunity connected
with the Eleventh Amendment, but obviously originating elsewhere,
which protected states from suits brought against them in federal
court by their own citizens, even if brought to enforce federal law.4"
Somewhat simplified, this year's Alden decision extends that implicit
immunity to suits against states in their own courts.44 More precisely,
Alden concludes that there is no general federal compulsion for a
state's courts to hear suits brought against that state based on federal
40. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
42. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 281-89 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment was simply designed to close the
federal court to suits where jurisdiction was based on party status but not to suits where the
cause of action arose under federal law); see also John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 2004 (1983) (con-
cluding that "[i]t is time for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the eleventh amend-
ment applies only to cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal court depends solely
upon party status"); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1, 44-51 (1988) (concluding that neither the original Con-
stitution nor the Eleventh Amendment conferred on states' immunity from suits to enforce
federal law, but recognizing the possibility that states possessed a federal common law im-
munity that would yield to legislation enforcing federal rights via authorization of suits
against states).
43. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1890).
44. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding "that the powers dele-
gated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the
power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts").
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law.45 Seminole and Alden together explain all of this from the states'
rights majority's perspective. In their view, states have a sovereign im-
munity from suits that was implicitly guaranteed under the original
Constitution,4 6 another example of something significant "going with-
out saying" under the Constitution.47 From the states' rights major-
ity's perspective, the Eleventh Amendment simply repaired the
Supreme Court's one narrow mistake as to the existence of this immu-
nity, so that, after its enactment, states were in the position originally
intended.4" Specifically, states were in the position of having no fed-
eral obligation to suffer suits brought against them by individuals,
even those brought to enforce federal law against them in their own
courts or in federal courts.
For those who wish to understand this immunity, two related
questions must be answered. First, what counts as a suit against a
state? And, second, how can federal law continue to be supreme if
immunity prevents suits against states which violate that law?
45. Of course state law-statutory and constitutional-can choose to open state courts
to federal claims of any sort, except the few that are exclusively cognizable in federal court.
As for Congress's special power under the Fourteenth (and possibly the Thirteenth, and
Fifteenth) Amendment to abrogate state immunity, see supra notes 7, 20. Additionally,
there may be special cases in which state courts are obligated to hear federal claims against
states despite the lack of a statute specifically abrogating state immunity. See First Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) (raising the
possibility that the "just compensation" component of the Fifth Amendment itself, or as
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment against states, is an unusual provision requir-
ing that governments provide judicial remedies against themselves to compensate for tak-
ing of property); Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1994) (indicating that, in some
circumstances, a state must allow a judicial-style proceeding for a refund of taxes illegally
collected).
46. The Seminole Court offered the following explanation:
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, "we have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition...
which it confirms." That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in
Hans v. Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our
federal system; and second, that "[i] t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent,"... . For over a
century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsent-
ing States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judi-
cial power of the United States."
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (in-
ternal citations omitted).
47. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
48. SeeYoung, supra note 3, at 1424-25 (noting that "the Seminole Court perceives the
Eleventh Amendment as merely a correction of Chisholm's mistaken view that the Constitu-
tion permits federal courts to hear suits against states brought by citizens of other states" (foot-
note omitted)).
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The answer to the first question is that all suits against unconsent-
ing states as named parties are suits against states, barred by immunity
unless Congress has abrogated that immunity under its Fourteenth
Amendment powers. Also barred are some suits naming only state
officers as defendants. 49  The answer to the second is that the
Supreme Court has made supremacy of federal law meaningful by al-
lowing federal courts to hear most, but not all, suits brought against
state officers, in their official capacities, to stop them from enforcing
state policy that violates federal law.50 It has done so by means of a
fiction that regards these suits as not against a state, when, obviously,
they are. 5' Any suit that stops an officer from obeying the command
of a state constitution, the state legislature, or a duly authorized state
agency, is functionally against the state. State policy needs arms and
49. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (citing, with approval, an opinion of a
United States court of appeals: " ' It is one thing to ... [require a state officer to comply
with federal law in the future.] It is quite another to order ... [him] to use state funds to
make reparation for he past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment. .. .' We agree with Judge McGowan's observations." (citations omitted)).
50. Compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) ("[I]ndividuals, who, as of-
ficers of the State... threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or
criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the
Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action."),
with Seminole, 517 U.S. at 73-76 (accepting, but slightly limiting, the ability of federal courts
to enjoin state officers to comply with federal law).
51. The Court explained the creation of the fiction:
[T]he injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact
on the State itself, on the view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an
official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or representative
character," . . . This rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment. Nonetheless, the Young
doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the
United States." As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was the culmi-
nation of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to promote the
supremacy of federal law must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity
of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v.Jordan. We recognized that the
prospective relief authorized by Young"has permitted the Civil War Amendments
to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely a shield, for those
whom they were designed to protect." But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to
encompass retroactive relief for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immu-
nity of the States.
Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-05 (1984) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted); see also PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIvIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 871 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing Ex parte
Young as resting "on a fictional tour de force").
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legs for its execution. In many, but not all circumstances, federal
courts have been permitted to enjoin state agents who have been duly
authorized under state law to take action that violates federal law.52
But which suits against state officers in their official capacities,
designed to thwart unconstitutional state policy, are acknowledged to
be against states and thus barred? And which are allowed to go for-
ward cloaked in the fiction that they are not suits against states? This
question lies at the heart of the present Article, which deals with com-
pensation for those injured by a violation of federal court orders. At
least until recently, there has been a reasonably clean line between
those official capacity suits against state officers that were permitted
and those that were not.53 Suits against officers in their official capaci-
ties, brought to compel future compliance with valid federal laws,
were allowed to proceed.54 These actions, usually for a negative in-
junction, but sometimes for a mandatory one, tightly controlling fu-
ture behavior, were called Ex parte Young suits, after the exemplar of
the category.55 Note that these suits-for example desegregation suits
and others seeking institutional restructuring-often required great
expenditures of state money.56 Still they were allowed.
52. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-69 (permitting federal courts to issue orders
against state officers compelling prospective compliance with federal law but not to compel
them to pay damages out of the state funds for past violations of federal law).
53. The reasonably clean line was that between prospective suits against state officers to
enjoin future violations of federal law and suits against officers seeking to compel pay-
ments from the state treasury to compensate plaintiffs for past violations of federal law.
The first was allowed; the latter barred. See infta notes 54-55, 58 and accompanying text.
However, the line was always only reasonably clean. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267
(1977) (struggling with the validity of a lower court order, which, in some respects, was
retrospective and compensatory and in others future-oriented and aimed at assuring con-
tinuing compliance with federal law); Edelman, 415 U.S. 661 (stating that the difference
between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under
Ex parte Young will not, in many instances, be that between day and night).
54. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
55. ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (enjoining a state officer from enforcing state
law violative of the federal Constitution); see Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55 (describing suits seek-
ing such relief against state officers as "brought under Ex Parte Young'); Edelman, 415 U.S.
at 667 (referring to relief permitted "under Ex Parte Young").
56. See Edelman, 415 U.S., at 667-68. The Court in Edelman stated:
Later cases [after Ex parte Young] from this Court have authorized equitable re-
lief which has probably had greater impact on state treasuries than did that
awarded in Exparte Young. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), Arizona
and Pennsylvania welfare officials were prohibited from denying welfare benefits
to otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), New York City welfare officials were enjoined from following New York
State procedures which authorized the termination of benefits paid to welfare
recipients without prior hearing. But the fiscal consequences to state treasuries
in these cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their
terms were prospective in nature. State officials, in order to shape their official
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On the other side of the line, those prohibited by immunity were
(1) suits naming an unconsenting state as defendant,"y and (2) all
suits seeking payment from the state treasury to compensate for past
wrongs, without state consent. Suits in category (2) are exemplified
by those brought to redress torts and breaches of contract. Note that
such suits were forbidden despite the naming of a state officer in his
official capacity, instead of the state, as the party defendant."8
This line-between the forbidden compensation suits and the
permitted ones seeking prospective relief-remains fairly clean,
although it has been blurred slightly by the recent Coeur dAlene case.
Coeur d'Alene holds that, in addition to suits aimed at making state
officers compensate individuals out of state funds, a small set of other
suits against state officers implicate state sovereignty to such a degree
that they will be classified as against a state and thus barred by immu-
nity.59 Despite this and some very troubling statements from two of
the states' rights Justices,6 ° Ex parte Youngsuits remain generally avail-
able to those injured by states' violations of federal law. The focus of
this Article is what, ultimately, does such an injunction mean? Can
federal courts, in civil contempt proceedings, force a state to compen-
sate private parties for the harm resulting from a state's violation of
the injunction which protected them?
Alden and Seminole make this question crucial because, before
they were decided, alternative avenues of relief were open or arguably
open to plaintiffs seeking damages against states. Seminole eliminates
one such avenue by reversing an earlier case that permitted Congress
to abrogate states' immunity from suits that assert rights created
conduct to the mandate of the Court's decrees, would more likely have to spend
money from the state treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their
previous course of conduct. Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a
permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in
Ex parte Young....
Id. (footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted).
57. See id. at 663.
58. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72; see also supra note 3.
59. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 285-88 (1997) (holding that certain
suits against state officers to quiet title to land and which implicate major state interests are
outside of the exception to state immunity and thus barred).
60. Parts of Justice Kennedy's opinion (otherwise for the majority), joined only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, advocated making the availability of an Ex parte Young remedy
depend upon a balancing test which included as one factor the availability of relief in state
courts. Id. at 270-88 (Opinion of Kennedy, J.). For the disagreement of Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas on this point see id. at 288, stating that Ex parte Young suits
are presumptively within the federal courts jurisdiction, and not barred by principles of
federalism including immunity.
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under Article I. 6 So congressional action is no longer a means for
providing compensation for such rights-holders, although it remains
viable for federal laws written to enforce Fourteenth Amendment
rights. A remaining possibility was suing in state courts, which argu-
ably had a federal obligation to be open to compensate holders of
rights created under Article I.62 Alden closes this avenue of redress
against states for violation of rights based solely on Article I. As a re-
sult, the possibility of compensation for harm resulting from a state's
violation of an injunction protecting such rights takes on a new impor-
tance. It is one of the last two possible avenues for compensation
short of constitutional amendment. The first remaining possibility is
that some rights created under Article I, when vested, will fall under
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and the power of Con-
gress to do away with state immunity in enforcing that amendment.6 3
My topic is the other possible avenue for relief: an Ex parte Young
injunction followed by civil contempt proceedings.
III. H UTTO V. FINEYAND LOWER COURT CASES: FACTS
AND AMBIGUITIES
A. Hutto's Endorsement of Compensation for Private Victims of State
Defiance of Federal Injunctions
In Hutto v. Finney,64 the Supreme Court considered objections by
the State of Arkansas to the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirming a federal district court's
award of attorneys' fees against the state for bad faith violation of the
district court's earlier prison reform orders.65 While part of the award
was made under a civil rights attorneys' fee statute, which was found to
abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,66 a portion of
the award was based solely on the powers of federal courts to enforce
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
62. See RicHAR H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1076 (4th ed. 1996) (raising the question, answered affirmatively later
in Alden, as to whether state courts are generally free to refuse to hear federal law suits
brought against their sovereigns).
63. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
64. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
65. See id. at 680-85 (considering the court of appeals decision to uphold $20,000 in
attorneys' fees to be paid out of Department of Correction funds).
66. See id. at 693-96 (concluding that the $2500 in attorneys' fees, levied by the court of
appeals pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, is not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment).
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their own orders.6 7 This portion served not only to deter violations of
the original court order but to compensate private parties (in this case
prisoners' attorneys) for harms caused by the violations subsequent to
the injunction6" (in this case unreimbursed fees for work that would
not have been done if the original order had been honored). The
Supreme Court found that the portion of the fees not covered by the
statute was allowable as in the nature of a civil contempt award. Em-
phasizing that the Ex parte Youngline of cases permits official-capacity
injunctive suits to stop continuing violations of federal law the Court
continued:
Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Many of the
court's most effective enforcement weapons involve financial
penalties. A criminal contempt prosecution for "resistance
to [the court's] lawful. . . order" may result in ajail term or a
fine.
The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amend-
ment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to en-
force their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail.
The less intrusive power to impose a fine is properly treated
as ancillary to the federal court's power to impose injunctive
relief.
In this case, the award of attorney's fees for bad faith
served the same purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil
contempt.
Instead of assessing the award against the defendants in
their official capacities, the District Court directed that the
fees are "to be paid out of Department of Correction
funds."6
In a post-Hutto court of appeals case, reading Hutto correctly as
ranging beyond claims seeking attorneys' fees, the court saw Hutto as
supporting its decision that state funds must be used to compensate a
hospital injured by a state's failure to honor a consent decree that it
67. See id. at 689-93 (considering whether the district court's award of attorneys' fees
for the State's failure to comply with the court's injunction is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment).
68. Id. at 691 n.17 ("That the award had a compensatory effect does not in any event
distinguish it from a fine for civil contempt, which also compensates a private party for the
consequences of a contemnor's disobedience." (citation omitted)).
69. Id. at 690-92 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (footnote omit-
ted). Of the material omitted from the above quotation, some suggests that there may be
limits on forcing state officers to compensate private parties from state funds for violation
of federal court orders intended to protect those private parties.
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agreed to in federal district court.70 For the unanimous panel Judge
Richard Posner stated:
[T] he district court [below] found that the state had violated
the consent decree. If this finding is correct, the Eleventh
Amendment is no bar to ordering the state to reimburse the
hospitals at the higher rate they seek, for the period. . . dur-
ing which the consent decree was in effect. Against a state
that violates a valid federal court decree the court has the
power to issue any order necessary to enforce the decree,
including an order to pay. Hutto v. Finney .... Whether one
calls such an order one of civil contempt or, as we would
prefer out of comity to characterize it, an equitable supple-
ment to the consent decree, it is within the power of the fed-
eral court to make.71
B. Ambiguities in Hutto
On careful reading, Hutto is a strong, but not unalloyed, endorse-
ment of use of the federal contempt power to compensate those in-
jured by states' refusals to comply with federal court injunctions
enforcing federal law on behalf of private beneficiaries. In approving
the attorneys' fees, the Court made some observations that, at the
least, made Hutto an easier decision by eliminating some factors that
might have strengthened the state's claims to immunity. These fac-
tors, while themselves ambiguous to some degree, cast light on how
the Court might narrow Hutto, thus expanding state immunity:
70. See Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987).
71. Id. at 868 (citation omitted). Judge Posner further explained the rationale underly-
ing the court's decision:
We do not suggest that by consenting to the original decree the defendants
waived the state's fights under the Eleventh Amendment. The decree did not
engage the Eleventh Amendment. The decree settled a genuine, noncollusive
case that was within the exception to the Eleventh Amendment that Ex parte
Young created, and it was a proper settlement that didn't violate anybody's rights.
Compare Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Dunn v.
Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1986). Nor did the order that we have called an
equitable supplement expand the scope of the decree, as in Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807
F.2d 1243, 1252 (5th Cir. 1987). If it did, the expanded portion might be within
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment. But all the order did was coerce (or at-
tempt to coerce) compliance with the decree; and, as we have said, if a decree is
valid an order enforcing it is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A fine for
contempt, payable by the defendants in their official capacities (and therefore by
the state itself, as we said), would have been within the power of the district court.
See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 690-92.
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(1) compensation was not the sole motive for awarding the
fees, but, as with civil contempt awards, the compensation
also served as a penalty for failure to follow a federal court's
order;72
(2) while the district court provided some compensation in
making the award, it said that it would "make no effort to
adequately" compensate for harm done as a result of the vio-
lation of the court order;73
(3) there was no contention that the award was "so large or
so unexpected that it [would interfere] with the State's
budgeting process," indicating that the Eleventh Amend-
ment "may counsel moderation in determining the size of
the award or in giving the State time to adjust its budget
before paying the full amount of the fee";7 ' and
(4) the state did not claim that the award "was larger than
necessary to enforce the court's prior orders. 75
In considering what these observations may portend, it is impor-
tant to observe that the Court did not say that any of them were neces-
sary to the validity of a compensatory award. It simply made it clear
that the absence of the factors mentioned made approving the award
an easier decision. As a result, there are two main ways that a court
adhering to Hutto could apply it to future, more difficult, cases,
although there are many possible nuanced positions in between. Be-
low I will present the alternatives and in the next section evaluate
them.
The first reading (below, the "strong reading of Hutto") would be
a presumptive full compensation model. It would assume that benefi-
ciaries of Ex parte Young injunctions, ignored by a state in bad faith,
would be fully compensated, absent some especially potent problems
of federalism. On this reading, the cautionary statements in Hutto
would be analyzed as follows. The first factor-requiring that the
court's contempt order be partially punitive7 6-adds nothing. All civil
contempt awards that compensate also have punitive motives designed
to compel observance of federal court orders.
The second factor-that the fee award was only partially compen-
satory77-can be dismissed as not necessary to the decision. The Hutto
Court makes clear that it was not reviewing a fully compensatory
72. See Hutto, 437 U.S. at 691-93.
73. See id. at 691.
74. Id. at 692 n.18 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 n.11 (1974)).
75. Id.
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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award7" and so if its statements were somehow taken as forbidding
such awards, they are dicta. More significantly, the Court does not
seem to have issued such dicta. Its observation that the award was not
fully compensatory may be seen as postponing a decision concerning
the general validity of civil contempt orders aimed at awarding full
compensation in favor of those protected by an injunction and against
a state which violates it.
After Hutto, it remains possible that full compensation is the
norm, but that a state might establish some sort of justification as to
why its sovereignty interests permit it to inflict injury in violation of a
federal injunction and without compensation to the party protected
by the federal court order. One such justification could take into con-
sideration the third factor7 9 cited by the Hutto Court, that the award in
that case was not unexpected or massive. Perhaps some awards
against states might be disallowed or limited upon the state's demon-
strating surprising or devastating harm to its fiscal well-being,
although this possibility raises difficulties discussed below. 0
Finally, the fourth factor-that the contempt order do no more
than is necessary to enforce the prior order 81-could be read to in-
clude presumptive full compensation in the notion of "enforcement"
of an injunction. From this perspective, a fully compensating award,
by definition, would not be larger than necessary to "'enforce' the
court's prior orders." The assumption of compensation makes this
view a private rights model.
However, a weak reading of Hutto---a public rights view-is also
possible. This weak reading will occur if the Court ultimately gives
more bite to the cautionary factors as they come into play in future
cases. On this view, it is always future deterrence that is the para-
mount factor in making an award. Once harm is done, whether from
the initial violation of a federal right or from one or more violations
of federal court injunctions protecting such a right, the court must
estimate what monetary penalty will bring the state into compliance,
and then, secondarily, it may use such amount to compensate injured
beneficiaries of the original court order. If already leaning in this
way, one might read the first cautionary factor in Hutto as suggesting
that deterrence is primary and that compensation is secondary. Like-
wise, the second factor, that the court did not attempt to provide full
compensation for the harm done, may be read as consistent with the
78. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 691.
79. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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existence of nothing resembling a private right to compensation. The
third factor-the absence of either a budgetary surprise or a massive
award-does leave a lot to future definition. It is consistent, however,
either with the view that these considerations limit even the courts'
power to deter future violations or perhaps that they are problems
that normally exist only when a court has gone far beyond what is
necessary to insure future compliance.
Finally, on this model, the fourth factor-a court's not going be-
yond what is necessary to "enforce" its prior order-means not going
beyond what is necessary to insure a reasonable likelihood of future
compliance, regardless of whether compensation has been achieved.
In short, despite a state's great recalcitrance and its multiple violations
of a federal injunction, followed in each case by judicial reiteration,
an injured party is never entitled to full compensation for any of the
violations. On this model, the focus, after each violation, is on coerc-
ing the state to honor the injunction in the (then) future, whether
what is necessary is a fine less than, equal to or greater than the in-
jured party's harm. The fact that the sum exacted is paid to the in-
jured party is secondary to the primary focus on coercion.
IV. THE FUTURE OF HUTTO
What will the current Court's approach be to the issues raised by
Hutto? Up to the time of the Court's recent cases on state immunity, it
found itself pulled in opposite directions by what it saw as the compet-
ing claims of supremacy of federal law and of state sovereignty inter-
ests. As described above, the compromise that it reached partially
addressed functional interests of the states and partly their symbolic,
dignitary interests. The functional protections were aimed at protect-
ing a state from undue, and often unpredictable, fiscal difficulties.
Specifically, states were protected from having to pay damages from
their treasuries to compensate individuals for their past wrongs, re-
gardless of whether the named defendant was the state itself or was an
officer sued in his official capacity.8 2
The symbolic protections were those forbidding the naming of a
state as a party, regardless of the relief sought.83 This compromise,
admitted to involve a fiction, permitted suits against federal officers to
compel future compliance with federal law.8 4 To this considerable ex-
tent federal supremacy won out, but with the original face-saving pre-
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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tense, now abandoned even as pretense,85 that such suits are not
against states, when of course, they are.
Once Seminole and Alden eliminated other possibilities for com-
pensation for violation of rights created under Article 1,86 the ques-
tion became whether federal courts can protect holders of such rights
from harm caused by state violations. The strong view of Hutto does
allow such protection. Despite the Court's aversion to forcing states
to compensate, that view has many virtues as a compromise position.
It protects both the functional and the dignitary interests of states as
identified in the Supreme Court's state immunity jurisprudence, while
at the same time offering protection to federal rights holders and ac-
cording dignity to federal court orders.
First, as to the functional interests of states, Hutto sees concern
with "[excessively] large or unexpected" awards against states.87 An
injunction ameliorates surprise and difficulties of adjustment to fed-
eral law by giving states notice of what is expected. After an injunc-
tion issues, the state either can stop the offending conduct or make
the fiscal preparations necessary to pay for the harm caused by its vio-
lation. Indeed injunctions could be designed to provide notice at any
appropriate level of state government. Hutto also may be seen as rais-
ing concern about the size of an award against a state, whether or not
the making of the award or its size surprises the state. It is debatable
whether legitimate questions of federalism are raised by the size of an
award against a state for a clear violation of a federal court order,
particularly if the order was not overturned on appeal after it was vio-
lated.88 But even if one thinks that large awards are problematic, it
85. See supra note 51.
86. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Article I, operating
alone, does not grant Congress the authority to create rights enforceable against uncon-
senting states in state courts); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66, 72-73 (1996)
(holding that Article I, operating alone, does not grant Congress the authority to create
rights enforceable in federal court against unconsenting states). However, it is possible, in
some circumstances, for Congress to create rights under Article I that become property
rights which, in some circumstances, will be the legitimate objects of Congress's Four-
teenth-Amendment power to abrogate state immunity. See supra note 8.
87. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692 n.18 (1978).
88. There is normally a duty to obey court orders, even those later overturned on ap-
peal. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-19 (1967) (surveying decisions
regarding compliance with injunctions). Walker, however, makes it clear that exceptions
may be made for compelling circumstances. Id. at 318-19 (noting exceptions such as
where a procedural requirement . . . [is] sprung upon an unwary litigant when prior
practice didn't give him fair notice of its existence" (citation omitted)). The states' rights
majority might see the position of states as compelling in this regard, relieving them of the
normal obligation to obey an erroneous order until it is overturned. Taking the strong
view of state immunity by reading Hutto as not allowing fully compensatory civil contempt
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might still be possible to limit them so that, as in Hutto, they are paid
from funds allocated to the department of the state government in
which the violation occurred. 9 While this compromise position
might still pinch a state hard, it is not the same as requiring a state to
compensate out of general treasury funds.
Second, the requirement of a court order serves the symbolic or
dignitary state interests that are so important to the states' rights ma-
jority. Third, the requirement of a court order is not just any symbol
in service of those dignitary interests. One can argue forcefully that, if
the courts are open to Ex parte Young suits, then dignitary interests of
the federal courts require that those courts be able to force states vio-
lating court orders to compensate victims who were intended by Con-
gress to be rights holders. This is not an argument that such suits
would be advisory opinions if compensation were ruled out,9 ° for vio-
lation of court orders could have consequences other than state pay-
ment of damages, as Justices Rehnquist and White suggested in Hutto
itself.9 Any of these, such as the possibility of enforcement by a crimi-
nal contempt proceeding or a civil damage suit brought against the
officer in his personal capacity, would suffice to make the order
nonadvisory.
But Article III has many requirements going beyond prohibition
of advisory opinions.92 Federal courts should be able to treat victims
of state action, who win injunctions under federal law, as protegees,
offering them assurance that no further harm will be inflicted without
compensation. At the very least, this should be true if (1) Congress
intends the parties to be full beneficiaries of federal rights and not
just private attorneys-general, (2) Congress acts in accordance with
substantive constitutional law in creating the right and, perhaps, (3)
the size of the award or other unusual circumstances do not pose
proceedings against states, goes beyond carving out a states rights exception to Walke. It
relieves states of some of the normal consequences of disobeying a contempt order, even
after the time for appeals has run or after it has been affirmed by a United States court of
appeals or by the Supreme Court.
89. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 103-09 (1983) (discussing the pros and
cons of imposing liability on governmental entities from particular agencies, at one end of
the continuum, to the state itself at the other).
90. For a discussion of what are advisory opinions and why they are prohibited, see
FALLON ET AL., supra note 62, at 93-98.
91. See Hutto 437 U.S. at 716 (Justices Rehnquist and White, dissenting).
92. For example, that the federal courts not be used as puppets by Congress, see United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1871), or that courts not be assigned nonjudicial
duties ranging beyond the rendering of advisory opinions. See also Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 680-85 (1988) (suggesting that a statute authorizing close court supervision of the
Independent Counsel would be constitutionally suspect).
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some sort of catastrophic harm to the interests of states in a balanced
federalism.
This is not to say the Court will read Hutto as strongly as Judge
Posner did in the Reivitz case.9" But denying compensation for viola-
tions of court orders that enforce federal laws written under Article I
would not be understood best as a decision about state immunity from
suit. In reality, it would be a substantive trip backwards to National
League of Cities and beyond, denying the creation of private rights
against states, even when they stop acting most like states and enter
the marketplace. It would suggest that Congress cannot, in pursuit of
Article I objective, create private rights that are good against states.
On this view, as versus states, Nike's Ex parte Young action would
be brought, not by a rights holder, but by a self-interested private at-
torney general, allowed to proceed to keep the world safe for all trade-
mark holders. Violations of any injunction would be attended by
criminal contempt penalties or by civil contempt proceedings that are
not aimed in any substantial way at providing compensation to the
injured plaintiff. If that is the Court's regrettable course, it would be
preferable for it to be clear that it is revisiting Garcia and making a
statement about the scope of Congress's regulatory powers over states
and not about the options available to an Article III court when con-
fronted with violations of its orders protecting rights holders.
93. See supra Section III.B (discussing a "weak reading" of Hutto after discussing a
"strong reading").
2000]
